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The appeal of the idea of face expertise
We spend much of our lives looking at faces. The idea that we gain naturally acquired expertise at perceiving and recognising the kind of faces we encounter therefore has a powerful intuitive appeal. In fact it has become one of the most widely used theoretical perspectives in studies of face recognition. According to this perspective, acquired expertise makes us very good at recognising faces. Expertise has also been claimed to account for other-race effects (see Glossary) in face recognition, for the development of holistic processing, for inversion effects, and for similarities and differences between the recognition of faces and other types of visual stimuli as diverse as cars, dogs, birds, butterflies, chess positions, and greebles [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Nonetheless, there has been a highly polarised debate about the issues surrounding this interpretation, with strong opinions expressed on both sides. Our aim here is to show how this debate has often missed key points concerning expertise, and especially the role of face familiarity. Although we are usually good at recognising familiar faces, most of us experience substantial problems with recognising the identities of unfamiliar faces. We will discuss different criteria for expertise and outline recent experimental and computational studies that help in understanding the ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate to say that we are face experts.
Understanding the underlying determinants of expertise and their implications leads to a different resolution of the issues that offers a novel way forward.
The facial expertise debate
The idea of naturally acquired expertise in recognising faces is grounded in the observation that faces form a class of visual stimuli with high inter-item similarity that require within-category recognition at a subordinate level; the superordinate category being 'faces', and the subordinate categories the individual faces themselves. This idea received support from studies of acquired prosopagnosia Young and Burton -Are we face experts? (cont'd) 4 which had shown that inability to recognise familiar faces was often associated with problems in recognising other highly similar visual stimuli [9] . Because faces will so often need to be individuated in everyday life, the claim is that we become expert at doing this and that this expertise explains such well-known properties of face recognition as inversion effects and holistic processing [1] [2] .
This approach has been extended by introducing the greebles class of artificial stimuli to study perceptual expertise created in the laboratory [3] . Learning to individuate upright greebles can lead to inversion effects and enhanced holistic processing for greebles, and these effects may involve changes in brain regions typically considered to show face-specific responses [3, 5] . On this basis it has been claimed that what appear to be face-specific brain regions are better considered as regions dedicated to within-category recognition that have become 'automatized by expertise' [4] [5] .
This interpretation has been disputed by others who argue there are grounds for postulating an evolved neural substrate to face recognition [10] [11] [12] . For example, contrary to the hypothesis that faces make use of a generic ability to distinguish items within any visually homogeneous category, some cases of acquired prosopagnosia do seem to involve a face-specific impairment [13] [14] . The debate has been passionate because so much appears to be at stake. In essence, it seems to involve whether category selectivity (e.g. for faces) is a fundamental organising principle of visual cortex, or simply a by-product of acquired expertise. We will show that while this debate has undoubtedly sharpened our thinking and led to interesting findings, both conceptions miss key points.
What characterises acquired expertise?
Surprisingly, what it might actually mean to say that we are face experts is seldom discussed. Instead, the idea is usually directly linked to an assumed operational definition in which expertise is indexed through better recognition of upright than inverted stimuli or through enhanced holistic processing [1] [2] [3] .
Young and Burton -Are we face experts? (cont'd) 5 However, the idea of expertise clearly has a variety of different connotations. Most obviously, becoming expert requires extensive practice and perhaps some form of careful study, but also the consequence of this will involve reaching a high level of skilled performance. Criteria for expertise could therefore include a mixture of at least three things. First, expert performance should be based on substantial experience. Second, expert performance should lead to accurate responses. Third, as for other acquired skills, expert performance should involve a relatively high degree of automaticity [5, [15] [16] [17] .
Of course, there are well-known examples beyond the domain of face perception where the idea of acquired perceptual expertise clearly does apply, both in real contexts such as radiology and for expertise acquired in the lab (greebles).
Radiologists, for example, have learnt through years of practice and training to quickly and accurately detect abnormalities in scans [18] . The question at issue, though, is whether these forms of perceptual learning are actually comparable to face recognition?
One obvious potential parallel between face recognition and these examples of acquired expertise with stimuli other than faces lies in our first criterion for expertise; the role of experience. The importance of experience with faces is evident in many infant studies, including work on perceptual narrowing showing that infants become less adept at remembering pictures of monkey faces as they become more experienced with human faces [19] . Moreover, the extent of this perceptual narrowing can be reduced if non-human faces are more strongly present in the infant's environment, which again shows how the faces that are seen can shape perceptual organisation [20] . As adults we remain susceptible to effects of previous experience, as shown for example by other-race effects [21] [22] [23] whose origin can again be traced back to experience in early years [24] [25] [26] [27] . Although it is debated whether social psychological factors may also contribute to other-race effects [21, 28] , there is a clear contribution from perceptual factors [21, 29] . Likewise, the constraining effects of previous experience are revealed in the fact that it is very Young and Burton -Are we face experts? (cont'd) 6 difficult for adults to learn new faces from seldom-encountered formats, such as inversion or contrast negation [30] .
Substantial, lifelong perceptual experience is therefore undoubtedly important to face recognition, and in this sense the first of our criteria for face expertise does seem applicable. However, other criteria for expertise, including our second criterion of accurate performance, are not always met. Rather surprisingly, most of us are less good at some types of face recognition than we may like to think. In laboratory recognition memory tasks that involve trying to learn new faces, for example, any change between the studied and test images of a face creates a notable decrement in performance [31] [32] ; we seem to learn more about the specific photographs than the faces that were studied. Importantly, this is not simply a memory problem; the same difficulties arise in purely perceptual matching tasks with unfamiliar faces, as shown in Figure 1 [33] [34] [35] .
-----FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE, PLEASE -----In the face matching task shown in Figure 1 (a), average error rates are substantial (typically 30% with unlimited viewing time) even though the images are fairly standardised [33] ; the upper and lower images in Figure 1 (a) have much the same pose and expression and they were all taken on the same day, but with a different camera.
When a wider range of image differences in pose, expression, lighting and the date when the photograph was taken is introduced, most people do even worse. Try for yourself the task shown in Figure 1 (b) , which simply involves deciding how many different people are present in the array of 40 photos. When the faces used are unfamiliar to participants, they arrive at solutions involving between 3 and 16 different identities, with nine identities being the most common number [34] . In other words, participants typically think there are around nine different individuals in the set of 40 photos. However, there are actually only two. Most people tend to mistake differences between the images for differences in identity, leading them to 7 overestimate the number of faces in the display. If the faces are of another race, the level of performance drops still further [22] [23] .
This observation that most of us can be confused by the variability between images of the same unfamiliar face has been developed into the widely used Glasgow Face Matching Test, illustrated in Figure 1 (c) . The test shows a remarkable range of abilities across different individuals in the population, ranging from near-chance to near-perfect performance [35] . Furthermore, performance is highly stable; some people are consistently better at matching unfamiliar faces than others.
In sum, whereas the idea of generic naturally acquired expertise for face identity implies that we should find little difficulty in seeing whether photographs show same or different individuals, studies using unfamiliar faces show that, for most of us, this is far from the case.
Image variability is central to understanding the phenomena shown in Figure 1 .
Photographs of faces differ in many ways that include pose, expression, lighting, camera and lens characteristics. This variability can result from within-person variability (differences between different images of the same face) or betweenperson variability (differences between images of different faces). As Figure 1 shows, within-person variability can be substantial and for unfamiliar faces it is easily confused with between-person variability.
Importantly, just as the photographs in Figure 1 , real-life views of faces are also highly variable; this is true whether the faces are seen in person, in videos, or photographs. So potentially we should all have abundant experience of the consequences of image variability to draw upon. Despite this, our perception and recognition of unfamiliar face identity often does not meet standards of accuracy that could justify our second criterion for the 'expert' label, being instead prone to error in many circumstances. Even with lifelong experience, image variability can limit our ability to perceive identity in unfamiliar faces.
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The same findings arise in highly realistic conditions. For eye witness testimony, although witness confidence may well be correlated with correct identification of the suspect across a sample of cases [36] , it has long been known that individual witnesses can nonetheless be mistaken even when they are certain that they are correct [37] . Even when no event memory is required, such as when matching someone's face to a presented passport or an identity card, most people make many errors [38] [39] [40] , as described in Box 1.
-----BOX 1 ABOUT HERE, PLEASE -----As well as failing to account for problems most of us experience with unfamiliar face identity and the surprisingly high incidences of misrecognition in applied and forensic settings ( Figure 1 and Box 1), there are other substantial limitations to the applicability of the natural expertise hypothesis to face recognition. It cannot readily explain the large and stable individual differences in unfamiliar face recognition ability in the population [35] . Moreover, recent studies have shown significant heritability and genetic specificity of this ability, demonstrating influences beyond the role of naturally acquired expertise [43] [44] [45] [46] .
In fact, attempts to train or enhance face expertise mostly end in failure [40, [47] [48] .
While there are substantial inter-individual differences in unfamiliar face recognition ability, these are little affected by experience. For example, despite their training and extensive practice, passport officers and others who use face recognition throughout their working lives show the same variability in performance as the rest of the population [40] . Only forms of training involving unusual and task-specific strategies [42] have shown any benefit (see Box 1).
Nonetheless, despite these problems with perceiving individual face identity, there are things we can do relatively well with unfamiliar faces. Inferences concerning social characteristics such as gender, race and apparent age are reliable across different perceivers and often highly accurate [49] [50] . Although also linked to individual differences in overall ability, interpretation of facial expressions elicits 9 substantial inter-observer agreement [51] [52] [53] . People even agree with each other when making inferences of dubious validity, such as deciding whether the face of someone they have never seen before looks trustworthy or intelligent [50, [54] [55] [56] .
We need to understand how we can be good at perceiving some characteristics in unfamiliar faces when perception of unfamiliar face identity can be so problematic.
These social inferences often meet our second criterion of accurate (or at any rate, consensual) responses, suggesting that the idea of expertise for making them may have some merit, but with our third criterion of automaticity the evidence is mixed.
The problems with perception of unfamiliar face identity already discussed make clear that this cannot be considered automatic. We are often thought to have become so expert at perceiving other social characteristics in faces that they will be seen automatically [57] , and accurate or consensual judgements can be made even to relatively brief presentations that are in effect a single glance [58] [59] . For example, first impressions of unfamiliar faces based on 100 ms presentation often do not differ from impressions based on unconstrained presentation times [58] [59] .
However, only a relatively limited form of automaticity is shown if more stringent criteria are applied [16, 60] . For example, although people are very good at judging the gender or race of a briefly presented unfamiliar face seen in isolation, their accuracy drops sharply when asked to match pairs of faces on these dimensions and they don't know in advance whether they will be asked to make the match on gender or on race before the trial begins [60] . This drop in performance due to uncertainty about what to look for would not be expected if both gender and race are simultaneously and effortlessly perceived. It shows a limit to automaticity in perceiving more than just the identity of unfamiliar faces.
In sum, on balance there are grounds for claiming some form of generic face expertise based on our first criterion of lifetime experience of faces, but with more demanding criteria these grounds are stronger for the aspects of unfamiliar face perception that do not involve recognition of identity.
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The key role of face familiarity Findings of the type summarised in Figure 1 and Box 1 all involve unfamiliar faces.
For familiar faces, matters are completely different. Recognising familiar faces is of primary importance to humans, since it forms a key means of identifying a known individual and retrieving appropriate person-specific knowledge to support interaction based on past experience [49, [61] [62] [63] [64] . Familiar face recognition is therefore embedded in a broader context of retrieval of semantic and emotional information that gives familiar faces rich layers of meaning [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] .
These rich semantic and emotional properties of familiar faces may in themselves account for some of the differences between familiar and unfamiliar faces [70] [71] , but there is also a strong visual component. Although we occasionally make errors in recognising familiar faces in everyday life [72] [73] , recognition is usually fast and accurate across huge variations in image properties, even for degraded or briefly presented images [74] [75] . Matching tasks with familiar faces seem to most participants almost trivially easy [34, 76] and familiar face recognition can meet criteria for automaticity [60, [77] [78] . We seem almost not to notice the sheer scale of variability in our encounters with familiar faces, and it may be this that misleads us into expecting that we will also be good at recognising unfamiliar face identity [60] .
Although there may well be individual differences in ability to recognise familiar faces, even those at the bottom of the range of ability in matching or learning unfamiliar faces (for example, in congenital prosopagnosia) may still able to recognise a number of familiar faces [79] [80] [81] . Moreover, covert responses in acquired prosopagnosia show that some aspects of familiar face recognition can be remarkably resilient [65, [82] [83] [84] [85] .
Understanding how view-invariant recognition of familiar faces is achieved, and why recognition of unfamiliar faces across equivalent image changes is relatively poor, are therefore key theoretical tasks [61] [62] 75] . Significant progress has been made in recent work.
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-----BOX 2 ABOUT HERE, PLEASE -----Box 2 summarises recent work that shows that familiar face-based expertise is necessarily idiosyncratic to each of the faces we know well [86] . By studying the variability across different images of the same face (for example, the statistical range of images of Angela Merkel across different poses, lighting and facial expressions) it has become clear that the ways in which one person's face varies are different from the ways in which someone else's face will vary. To recognise Angela Merkel from any image of her, then, our brains need to have learnt how to take into account this idiosyncratic, Merkel-specific variability. This means that it is an overstatement to claim people are experts at recognising all faces. Instead, it is more appropriate to say we are experts at recognising each of the faces we know; Angela Merkel, Tom Hanks, and so on. In fact our ability to learn the characteristics of a familiar face seems to surmount some of the limitations that are evident with unfamiliar faces, such as the other-race effect; there is no obvious decrement for recognition of other-race faces that have become familiar [87] [88] .
Interestingly, it turns out that being expert at recognising even just a handful of familiar faces across highly variable images is sufficient to create representations that can reliably distinguish social categories of gender and race. A standard computer engineering approach that can be used to train a computer model to identify highly varied images of different faces involves using PCA to capture the main dimensions of variability across the images and LDA to then cluster together images of the same face identity; in effect making these trained faces 'familiar' to the model [89] . A trained model shows properties analogous to human face recognition in that it performs well at recognising entirely new and highly variable images of familiar (trained) faces and performs less well at establishing whether different images of unfamiliar (i.e. untrained) faces are of the same person.
Importantly, the space derived to cluster together disparate images of the faces of only a small number of people can also code sex and race very reliably [89] .
Dimensions corresponding to these social categorisations simply emerge as a sideeffect of solving the identification problem, despite the fact that neither sex nor race 12 are explicitly coded in the modeling process. Remarkably, these dimensions generalise to unfamiliar faces too -allowing very accurate categorization of large numbers of faces, never previously encountered.
Learning to distinguish the gender and race of any face can therefore be an incidental consequence of expertise in recognising a small number of familiar faces.
It seems that the cues needed to distinguish gender or race covary with those needed to recognise familiar identities from the very different views we can encounter. This is interesting because learning to recognise a small number of familiar individuals closely approximates the task facing human infants in many societies and any evolved neural substrate for face recognition ability will have arisen within the context of relatively small social groups [90] . In contrast, a model trained only to classify gender offers no benefit to classifying identity [89] . What appear to be expert abilities in social categorisation may thus arise as an incidental consequence of expert recognition of personally familiar faces. This shows how what might seem like complex patterns of expertise can emerge from simple processes.
Here we have a simple clustering model which leads to some (familiar) faces being well-recognised and other (unfamiliar) faces being poorly recognised while all can be categorised well on the untrained dimensions of sex and race.
Concluding remarks
Our message is that face expertise takes a different form than is usually thought.
While there is undoubtedly a sense in which our huge experience of looking at the faces around us has created a kind of expertise, this does not take the form of the generic ability to recognise any face identity that has been so widely assumed. We To cope with the impact of this everyday image variability, our face recognition systems need to create representations that can deal with the different ways in which different known faces can vary. They are therefore driven to create an individually-tailored type of expertise for recognising each of the faces we know, and this explains why unfamiliar face identity can be problematic.
In effect, we are familiar face experts. This insight reframes the expertise debate in a way that has important implications for psychological theory and for a wide range of practical contexts such as passport control and witness testimony. Other-race effects: Refers to findings that most of us are better at learning and recognising unfamiliar faces that come from the own-race ethnic group with which we are most familiar. Similarly, we also show other-race effects for recognising facial expressions.
Unfamiliar faces: Faces of people we have not encountered before, or encountered very little. Understanding the perception and recognition of unfamiliar faces is critical to everyday concerns such as eyewitness testimony and passport control.
Within-category recognition:
The idea that a type of visual stimulus has a sufficiently homogeneous overall appearance that we need to distinguish between items within the overall category to recognise individual exemplars. Faces, cars, and flowers are commonly used examples where within-category recognition is said to be needed.
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TRENDS BOX
Trends
¥ There is a wide range of ability to recognise the identities of unfamiliar faces in the population.
¥ This variability is influenced by genes but does not seem amenable to training. Even having a job that requires matching unfamiliar faces does not lead to much improvement.
¥ Images of faces seen in everyday life are highly variable, and much of the problem many of us experience with unfamiliar face identity comes from not being able to determine whether variability is image-related or identityrelated.
¥ Although failures of familiar face recognition do sometimes occur, our ability to recognise familiar faces is mostly excellent, able to cope with degraded images and largely unaffected by image-related differences.
¥ Familiar face recognition meets broad criteria for expertise, but recognition of unfamiliar faces is expert only in the restricted sense that it is influenced by experience.
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS BOX Outstanding Questions
¥ Why are aspects of unfamiliar face perception other than identity recognition often accurate and/or reliable? Have we acquired specific expertise for these various tasks, or are some of these abilities incidental consequences of a system that is primarily oriented towards familiar face recognition? In a study which copied the general design of the face matching task shown in Figure   1 (a), the target was sometimes a real person, to be matched against photos. This did not make the problem easier -viewers made just as many errors matching to a real person as matching to a photo [38] .
In fact, this problem has been shown to persist even in highly natural settings. In a study conducted in a supermarket, using specially created identity cards that showed either a valid photograph (i.e., an actual photo of the person) or an invalid photograph (a photo of another person), the supermarket's own cashiers were told to look out for the fake identity cards and told that a bonus payment would be made to the cashier with the best performance [39] . Yet the cashiers only challenged about 10% of people presenting a valid card and accepted many of the invalid cards if there was some similarity in appearance. Thus, even comparing a photo of a face to the person standing in front of you is not as easy as we usually take it to be.
It turns out that unfamiliar face matching can also be a problem for professional groups that rely on this ability. For example, working passport officers make errors when asked to verify passport photos of volunteers during an identity check [40] .
Just like members of other populations, the passport officers display large individual differences, with some performing extremely well (almost perfectly) but others much more poorly. What is interesting is that these differences seem unrelated to experience; officers with as much as 20 years experience can still perform poorly 25 [40] . Despite the fact that experienced officers have lengthy training histories, there are just as many high and low scores from people with all levels of experience.
The difficulty of unfamiliar face matching in operational settings is beginning to be addressed in some organisations. One approach is used by the London Metropolitan Police, who select a small number of officers with high natural ability for a 'superrecogniser' unit, specializing in identification. This group reliably outperforms other officers and the general population on unfamiliar face identification tasks [41] .
An alternative to recruiting individuals with high aptitude is to provide highly specific training. Professional forensic face identification examiners, who are trained in how to make detailed comparisons across photographs, have also been studied [42] . They can outperform untrained participants and computer algorithms, but make use of careful feature comparison strategies that require substantial time and are little affected by inversion. In other words, forensic examiners have been trained to use methods quite unlike those used in normal face recognition. While they have been shown to do well on unfamiliar face identification tasks, they remain far from perfect and their performance doesn't reach levels which are commonplace in familiar face recognition.
Box 2. Face variability is idiosyncratic.
Different images of the same face can vary due to viewpoint, expression, lighting and other properties. Given this substantial variability, how can we characterise the invariant properties of each face that make recognition possible? One approach is to analyse how images of the same face vary by applying PCA to everyday photographs of the same person [86] ; PCA is a statistical technique that can reduce the dimensionality of photographs to a relatively small number of principal components (PCs). This is a widely used technique in the computer science literature, but it is mostly applied to images of different faces. That is, researchers usually run PCA across images of many different faces to establish dimensions on which faces differ from one another. In order to avoid coding superficial differences, the images used in PCA are usually photographed under standard conditions, to eliminate changes in pose, expression, lighting and so on. The implication is that we have to learn separately the relatively variant and invariant characteristics of each of the faces we know, because the variability across images is to some extent identity-specific [86] . We need to learn which 27 characteristics of a particular face are relatively consistent and which are variable.
This explains why unfamiliar face matching is so hard. Confronted with two images of an unfamiliar person, we often do not know whether or not the images fall with the range of variation for that person, making it hard to judge whether they are the same individual. For familiar people, we have learned how their faces can change, making a matching decision much easier. 
